From the Bench
The Hon. Gary S. Stein"
Justice Pollock and I were colleagues for more than fifteen of his
distinguished twenty-year tenure as an Associate Justice of the New
Jersey Supreme Court. He was a gracious and delightful colleague,
renowned for his quick wit, engaging manner, uninhibited personal
telephone calls in our presence to his beloved Penny, and a voracious
appetite for the court's conference room staple - the peanut butter
and jelly sandwich on a roll.
His relaxed style at the court's conferences tended to downplay
his careful and conscientious attention to details, nuances, and, most
of all, the institutional implications of our most difficult cases. His
primary focus was always on the long-term effect of our decisions,
their reconciliation with the most thoughtful and current scholarship
on the issue, and their implications for the public and other branches
of government. He was an "institutionally minded judge" in the best
sense of the term. His concerns transcended the immediate interests
of the litigants and encompassed an extensive overview of every case
that is so essential to the art of judging. Justice Pollock never failed
to see the forest, even as he attended to the trees.
In every court term, members have a variety of opinion-writing
assignments, some obviously more demanding than others. Justice
Pollock's opinions were consistently clear, crisp, thoughtful, and
persuasive. From my own perspective, I thought his most inspired
work was done when he was writing at the frontiers of the law,
challenged by novel issues that required the court to reconcile and
accommodate competing strains of public policy. A few shining
examples from his voluminous opinion portfolio are illustrative.
Early in his tenure, Justice Pollock authored the court's opinion
in O'Keeffe v. Snyder,' a challenging case involving a replevin action
filed by the noted artist Georgia O'Keeffe to recover from the
defendant three paintings that allegedly had been stolen from a New
York City gallery in 1946, some thirty-four years prior. The defendant
Associate Justice, NewJersey Supreme Court.
83 N.J. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980).
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contended that he was a purchaser for value, had acquired good title
by adverse possession, and that the statute of limitations barred
O'Keeffe's action.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate
Division ruled in favor of O'Keeffe, concluding that the paintings
were stolen, the defenses of expiration of the statute of limitations
and title by adverse possession were identical and, further, that the
defendant had not proved the elements of adverse possession.
Writing for the New Jersey Supreme Court, Justice Pollock concluded
that the statute of limitations, rather than the doctrine of adverse
possession, provided a more appropriate basis for resolving the
competing claims of title by both the artist and the art dealer. Justice
Pollock supported that conclusion with the following observations
about the problems affecting title to great works of art:
The limited record before us provides a brief glimpse into the
arcane world of sales of art, where paintings worth vast sums of
money sometimes are bought without inquiry about their
provenance. There does not appear to be a reasonably available
method for an owner of art to record the ownership or theft of
paintings. Similarly, there are no reasonable means readily
available to a purchaser to ascertain the provenance of a painting.
It may be time for the art world to establish a means by which a
good faith purchaser may reasonably obtain the provenance of a
painting. An efficient registry of original works of art might
better serve the interests of artists, owners of art, and bona fide
purchasers than the law of adverse possession with all of its
uncertainties. Although we cannot mandate the initiation of a
registration system, we can develop a rule for the commencement
and running of the statute of limitations that is more responsive
to the needs of the art world than the doctrine of adverse
possession.
We are persuaded that the introduction of equitable
considerations through the discovery rule provides a more
satisfactory response than the doctrine of adverse possession. The
discovery rule shifts the emphasis from the conduct of the
possessor to the conduct of the owner. The focus of the inquiry
will no longer be whether the possessor has met the tests of
adverse possession, but whether the owner has acted with due
diligence in pursuing his or her personal property.
Another early example of Justice Pollock's ability to resolve
competing strains of legal theory is illustrated by his opinion in Pierce
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.3 The plaintiff in Pierce was a medical
2
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Id. at 497, 416 A.2d at 872 (citation omitted).
84 N.J. 58, 417A.2d 505 (1980).
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doctor who was an employee-at-will of a pharmaceutical company.
The doctor's employment was terminated after she refused to
continue a research project that she regarded as medically unethical.
Her claim for damages against the employer required the court to
determine whether it should adopt an exception to the long-standing
common-law rule allowing an employer to discharge an at-will
employee without cause. Although concluding that the plaintiff had
not demonstrated any basis for relief under the specific facts of her
action,Justice Pollock, writing for the court, concluded:
The interests of employees, employers, and the public lead to the
conclusion that the common law of New Jersey should limit the
right of an employer to fire an employee at will ....
We hold that an employee has a cause of action for wrongful
discharge when the discharge is contrary to a clear mandate of
public policy. The sources of public policy include legislation;
administrative rules, regulations or decisions; and judicial
decisions. In certain instances, a professional
code of ethics may
4
contain an expression of public policy.

Balancing the interest of employees in job security against the
independent right of employers to choose their own work force,
Justice Pollock observed:
Employees will be secure in knowing that their jobs are safe if
they exercise their rights in accordance with a clear mandate of
public policy. On the other hand, employers will know that
unless they act contrary to public policy, they may discharge
employees at will for any reason. Finally, our holding protects the
interest of the public in stability of employment and in the
elimination of frivolous lawsuits.'
One of Justice Pollock's landmark opinions was filed in the case
of Spring Motors Distributors,Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. 6 The issue in Spring
Motors concerned the right of a commercial buyer to recover for
economic losses resulting from the purchase of defective goods.
Specifically, the issue was whether the buyer's cause of action was
restricted to remedies under the Uniform Commercial Code or
whether the buyer could also maintain a cause of action under state
law on the theory of negligence or strict liability. The distinction was
critical because the plaintiff had filed the action beyond the four-year
period permitted by the Uniform Commercial Code, but within the
six-year period applicable to state tort actions. Justice Pollock
4
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Id. at 71-72, 417 A.2d at 512.
Id. at 73, 417 A.2d at 512.
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emphasized the significance of the issue presented by highlighting
the conflict between the standards imposed by the Uniform
Commercial Code and the doctrine imposing strict liability on a
manufacturer responsible for introducing a flawed product into the
stream of commerce:
As the preceding cases demonstrate, the U.C.C. rules pertaining
to the sale of goods overlap the doctrine of strict liability for
placing a defective product in the stream of commerce. One
reason for the overlap is that strict liability, in this regard, evolved
from implied warranties of fitness and merchantability under the
U.C.C. and its predecessor, the Uniform Sales Act. Those
warranties originated as a matter of social policy to compensate
consumers who sustained personal injuries from defective food.
Neither the ALI, which published the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, nor the permanent editorial board of the U.C.C., which
operates as a joint project of the ALI and the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, has undertaken to resolve the overlap
402A and the breach
between strict liability as declared in section
7
of warranty provisions under the U.C.C.
Justice Pollock concluded that the plaintiff, a sophisticated
commercial buyer, should be restricted to the cause of action
Evidencing his
afforded by the Uniform Commercial Code.
commitment to the principle that courts should generally defer to
the policy choices made by the legislative branch of government,
Justice Pollock wrote:
Delineation of the boundary between strict liability and the
U.C.C. requires appreciation not only of the policy considerations
underlying both sets of principles, but also of the role of the
Legislature as a coordinate branch of government. By enacting
the U.C.C., the Legislature adopted a carefully-conceived system
of rights and remedies to govern commercial transactions.
Allowing Spring Motors to recover from Ford under tort
principles would dislocate major provisions of the Code. For
example, application of tort principles would obviate the statutory
requirement that a buyer give notice of a breach of warranty...
and would deprive the seller of the ability to exclude or limit its
liability . . . . In sum, the U.C.C. represents a comprehensive
statutory scheme that satisfies the needs of the world of
commerce, and courts should pause before extending judicial
doctrines that might dislocate the legislative structure.8
One ofJustice Pollock's more recent opinions, Snyder v. American
7
s

Id. at 570, 489 A.2d at 667-68 (citations omitted).
Id. at 577, 489 A.2d at 671.
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Ass'n of Blood Banks,9 concerned the liability of a trade association that
sets nationwide standards for blood banks to a transfusion recipient
who contracted Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) after
receiving blood contaminated with Human Immunodeficiency Virus
(HIV). The plaintiffs claim against the American Association of
Blood Banks (AABB) was based on recommendations promulgated
by an AIDS task force organized by the Centers for Disease Control
that recommended blood banks conduct surrogate testing to prevent
blood from high-risk donors from entering the blood supply. The
AABB resisted the recommendation, contending that surrogate
testing and direct questioning of donors would be too costly and
would lead to the rejection of too much blood.
After meticulously describing the evidence in the record relating
to the AABB's argument that it owed no duty to persons who received
contaminated blood, Justice Pollock concluded that the AABB did
owe the plaintiff a duty of care. Justice Pollock explained:
We recognize, moreover, that the development of tests for
infectious diseases often follows an indistinct path fraught with
uncertainty, debate, trial and error, and even failure. At some
point in the process, however, participants should recognize that
they have enough information to act responsibly and that the
failure to act would be irresponsible. Professional associations
concerned with matters of public health are not fraternal
organizations that exist solely for the benefit of their members.

Playing a vital role in the protection of health, these associations
are inescapably imbued with a public interest. The associations'
commitment to public health should not immunize them from

liability for the negligent discharge of their obligations. Nor
should the associations enjoy immunity when they stubbornly
reject persuasive evidence, unreasonably prolong the debate, and
fail to inform their constituents of threats to the public health.' °

In addition, Justice Pollock rejected the contention that the
AABB's nonprofit status entitled it to an absolute or qualified
immunity. Justice Pollock wrote:
The record reveals that the AABB led the charge against direct
questioning of donors and surrogate testing. Viewed most
favorably to the AABB, the evidence suggests that it was

concerned that such questioning and testing would be of limited
effectiveness and could diminish the supply of blood and blood
products. A less favorable view suggests that the AABB resisted
surrogate testing because it did not want to suffer the added
9
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144 N.J. 269, 676 A.2d 1036 (1996).
Id. at 306, 676 A.2d at 1055.
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inconvenience and costs of such testing. In assessing the role of
governmental and private decisionmakers involved with donor
screening, the Committee concluded "that it was reasonable to
require blood banks to implement these two screening
procedures [screening male donors for a history of sexual activity
with other males and screening donated blood for the anti-HBc
antibody] inJanuary 1983."
On the record, the jury could have concluded that the AABB in
1984 unreasonably resisted recognizing that blood transmits HIV.
That resistance led the AABB to sacrifice an uncontaminated
supply of blood for one that was contaminated, but more readily
available. The jury could have found that if the AABB had not
been so intransigent, its members . . . would have instituted
surrogate testing. Further, the jury could have found that if [this
particular blood bank] had instituted surrogate testing, it would
have rejected (the unit containing the contaminated blood].
Rejecting that unit could have prevented the transfusion of
contaminated blood to William Snyder. It could have saved his
health and his life. Against this background, we believe that the
imposition of liability on the AABB is both fair and reasonable"
In Ivaldi v. Ivaldi," another controversy with tremendous
competing policy interests, Justice Pollock addressed the issue
whether the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (Act) should
apply to a jurisdictional dispute between a citizen of New Jersey and a
citizen of Morocco relating to the custody of their minor child. The
child's parents were married in Morocco in 1992 and thereafter
resided in France, Morocco, and, commencing in 1994, in New
Jersey. A daughter was born to the couple in France in 1993. In
1995, the parents separated and entered into a comprehensive
separation agreement that provided the mother with physical custody
of the child. The agreement further provided that the mother would
reside in either France or Morocco and allow the father twelve weeks
of visitation each year. After the agreement was signed, the mother
and child moved to Morocco, where the mother filed an action for
divorce and child custody in the courts of Morocco. Immediately
thereafter the father filed suit in New Jersey, seeking sole custody.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division, Family Part,
concluded that the Act did not apply to disputes between foreign
countries and states of the United States, and that New Jersey had
subject-matter jurisdiction based on the child's substantial contacts
with New Jersey. The lower court ordered the mother to return the
1 Id. at 307, 676 A.2d at 1055 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
147 N.J. 190, 685 A.2d 1319 (1996).
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child to the United States and temporarily awarded the father sole
custody, thus restraining the mother from proceeding with her
custody action in Morocco.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed,
concluding that the lower court did not have subject-matter
jurisdiction over the parties and that the Act was inapplicable because
its focus was on jurisdictional conflict between courts of different
states, not between courts of different countries. Writing for the New
Jersey Supreme Court, Justice Pollock pragmatically explained why
the Act should be construed to apply to international child custody

disputes:
Judicial recognition of foreign custody decrees comports with
the reality that nations are drawing closer together. Information,
capital, and goods daily cross international boundaries. People
National
likewise travel regularly from country to country.
boundaries no longer prevent people from meeting or marrying.
Sometimes those marriages will end in divorce and custody

disputes. International child-custody actions have become part of
a global society.
With increasing frequency, state courts may confront custody
disputes arising from families comprised of citizens of different
countries. When resolving those disputes, a court may harbor
doubts about the law of another country, particularly when that
country's legal system, culture, religion, and language differ from
ours. Notwithstanding those doubts, the courts of another
country may provide a more convenient forum for determining
custody.

*

.

. [T]he Legislature has extended the Act's policies to the

determination of jurisdictional questions in international custody
cases. Those policies include the importance of the identification
of the "home state" and the need to avoid jurisdictional conflicts.
Our holding conforms also with a proposed revision of the
UCCJA, entitled the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act ("the UCCJEA"), which is under consideration
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. The proposed UCCJEA explicitly states that all of its
provisions apply to child custody proceedings of other countries,
including the jurisdictional determination of home-state priority.
In sum, we conclude that the Legislature intended the Act to
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apply to international child-custody litigation."
A final illustration of Justice Pollock's fascination with the
frontiers of legal doctrine occurred during his last term, in the case
of A. v. B."1 The unique factual setting in that case involved a law firm
that jointly represented a husband and wife in drafting wills that
devised their respective estates to each other.
The wills also
contained provisions creating the possibility that the issue of each
spouse ultimately would acquire the property of the decedent spouse.
Unknown to the firm or the wife, the husband recently had fathered
an illegitimate child. Prior to the execution of the couple's wills, the
illegitimate child's mother retained the same law firm to institute a
paternity action against the husband. A clerical error prevented the
firm's computers from ascertaining the existence of the conflict of
interest and resulted in the firm's representation of the child's
mother in a paternity action while simultaneously representing the
husband and wife in the estate-planning matter. When the conflict
was revealed, the law firm withdrew from representation of the
mother in the paternity action. The law firm then sought to disclose
to the wife that the husband had an illegitimate child. The husband
sued to restrain the disclosure of this information.
Justice Pollock's opinion noted that the case concerned
the conflict between two fundamental obligations of lawyers: the
duty of confidentiality, Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC)
1.6(a), and the duty to inform clients of material facts, RPC
1.4(b). The conflict arises from a law firm's joint representation
of two clients whose interests initially were, but now no longer are,
compatible.1 5
Justice Pollock's comprehensive opinion for the court reviewed all
the pertinent authorities, including the forthcoming Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers and the recommendations of
the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel. His meticulous
review of the relevant authorities and commentary supported the
court's conclusion that the law firm should be permitted to inform
the wife of the existence, but not the identity, of the husband's
illegitimate child. Justice Pollock opined:
The law firm learned of the husband's paternity of the child
through the mother's disclosure before the institution of the
paternity suit. It does not seek to disclose the identity of the
mother or the child. Given the wife's need for the information
is Id. at 200-03, 685 A.2d at 1324-25 (citations and footnote omitted).
:4 158 N.J. 51, 726 A.2d 924 (1999).
'5 Id. at 56, 726 A.2d at 926.
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and the law firm's right to disclose it, the disclosure of the child's
existence to the wife constitutes an exceptional6 case with
.compelling reason clearly and convincingly shown."
What the foregoing opinions by Justice Pollock have in common
is that each involved perplexing legal issues, the resolution of which
demanded a careful balancing of competing policy considerations.
In addition, the cases involved questions at the frontiers of the law
that had not previously been addressed by courts or commentators
with any degree of conclusiveness. Justice Pollock always thrived on
such challenges and brought his broad perspective and institutional
insights to the New Jersey Supreme Court's most difficult cases. His
unique ability as a judge to resolve doctrinal conflicts and nudge the
law in the right direction was one of his special gifts, as well as one of
his enduring legacies as a member of our court.
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